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Abstract 
Do international organizations generate benchmarks and data as tools for policy enforcement or as 
tools of knowledge creation? This paper suggests the latter through a case study on the power of 
numbers in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
(FSAP). While the IMF is typically viewed as an institution that enforces global standards for 
economic governance through the imposition of quantitative targets (‘numbers’), we suggest that its 
use of benchmarking tools through the generation of financial data actually serves as knowledge 
creation tool for policy dialogue. As such, the IMF’s program practices differ from their policy 
proclamations on the need for universal standards and transparency. Seen through a pragmatist lens, 
as often found in economic sociology, the IMF seeks to generate ‘learning by monitoring’ with 
member states within its broader international political and economic constraints. This process must 
yield to broader principal-agent dynamics in the IMF’s governance structure, as well as tip its cap to 
private market actors. But it is also not hostage to them. We suggest that the IMF’s use of ‘pragmatic 
numbers’ within FSAPs demonstrates one method by which an institution seeks to foster learning 
within an environment of noise and domination. 
 
Keywords: International Monetary Fund; Pragmatism; Ambiguity; Financial 
Reform; Learning; Policy Dialogue. 
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Introduction 
 
International economic crises require international organizations to respond 
appropriately lest they lose legitimacy. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, 
the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) provided loan conditions to East Asian 
and Southeast states that generated a great deal of ill will. The IMF’s role in the 
‘discursive demolition’ of the East Asian model (Hall, 2003) backfired in the 
aftermath of the crisis as its conditions were widely held to be not only harsh but 
fighting economic conditions found in the 1980s rather than the 1990s. The image of 
the IMF’s then Managing Director Michel Camdessus peering cross-armed over 
Indonesian President Suharto while he signed a loan agreement lingered within the 
region’s collective consciousness as an example of bully tactics. Since then a number 
of scholars have argued that the IMF imposes a ‘standard of civilization’ (Best, 
2006a) and that the IMF represented a ‘Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex’ (Wade 
and Veneroso, 1998; Wade 2006). Others have suggested that the IMF has embarked 
on a program to impose ‘transparency’ and ‘ownership’ upon its member states that 
harks back to older arguments on a standard of civilization (Best, 2006a; Abdelal, 
2007).  
 
We suggest that such arguments hold water when it comes to the IMF’s policy 
proclamations. However, they become weaker once we investigate the IMF’s policy 
practices and how it seeks to enforce the standards it creates. While the IMF is 
typically viewed as an institution that enforces global standards for economic 
governance through the imposition of quantitative targets (‘numbers’), we suggest 
that its use of benchmarking tools through the generation of financial data actually 
serves as knowledge creation tool for policy dialogue. As such, the IMF’s 
programme practices differ from their policy proclamations on the need for 
universal standards and transparency. Seen through a pragmatist lens, as often 
found in economic sociology, the IMF seeks to generate ‘learning by monitoring’ 
with member states within its broader international political and economic 
constraints. This paper investigates this process through a case study on the ‘power 
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of numbers’ in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (FSAP). We suggest that the pragmatic use of numbers within the 
process of FSAPs informs us of how the IMF seeks to generate knowledge creation. 
We argue that the IMF actively promotes ambiguity in how the numbers are 
generated and discussed while its more senior officials stress transparency (cf. Best, 
2005, 2010). More specifically, we argue that the IMF uses ‘pragmatic numbers’ as a 
learning device and to create policy dialogue. In this paper we emphasise how this 
process is not immune to broader principal-agent dynamics in the IMF’s governance 
structure, but not hostage to them either. The IMF is required to send signals that it 
is pro-market, which complicates not only its ‘organizational personality’ (Vetterlein, 
2006), but also its capacity to gain the confidence that it will not report poor 
information on states it is engaged in monitoring or fostering policy dialogue with.  
We suggest that the IMF’s use of ‘pragmatic numbers’ within FSAPs demonstrates 
one method by which an institution seeks to foster ambiguity for learning within an 
environment of noise and domination. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: 1. We discuss the IMF’s work through the concepts 
of transparency, ambiguity, and pragmatism; 2. we briefly outline the history and 
rationale for FSAPs; 3. We draw upon interviews1 to outline how FSAPs are not 
dissimilar in function, if not form, from the Open Method of Coordination; and 4. 
We reflect on the use of pragmatic numbers within FSAPs and how the IMF seeks to 
foster policy dialogue for financial reform.  
 
1. Ambiguity, Transparency and Pragmatism 
 
Within international political economy much of the literature on the IMF has 
concentrated on how the IMF constraints borrowing governments through loan 
conditionality and why the IMF chooses to favour some states over others (Woods 
and Lombardi 2006; Stone 2008; Gould 2006; cf. Momani, 2005).  Within this 
literature the assumption has been that command structures matter. Principals 
inform agents of their interests and they act upon them. In some case agents can 
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develop internal cultures in which ‘pathologies’ can deviate from the principals’ 
interests (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), and actors can carry ideas and norms into 
institutions that do not automatically conform to the expectations of the principals 
(Chwieroth, 2007). For the most part, the IMF is considered to be an institution that 
responds to the interest of its key members, such as the US, and is a ‘rational design’ 
institution, flaws and all (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001).  
 
Within these frameworks the presence or absence of quantitative targets matters. In 
particular, studies of loan conditionality have stressed how the production of 
quantitative benchmarks provides a superior means of enforcement of loan 
conditions compared to ‘soft’ quantitative targets. For example, Graham Bird (1996, 
2002) has stressed the importance of quantitative targets as a means of enforcement, 
and Eric Gould has demonstrated how ‘supplementary financiers’ on IMF loans 
prefer to have clear targets (2006). Yet the FSAP is characterized by ‘soft targets’ 
dissembled by the IMF during the FSAP exercise to engage authorities in dialogues, 
as discussed in the third section of this paper. 
 
The use of quantitative targets is also viewed as a means of enforcing a standard of 
civilization. Jacqueline Best (2005, 2006b, 2008, 2010) argues that the IMF’s push on 
‘transparency’ seeks to enforce a global standard of civilization (see also Larmour, 
2006). Best suggests that the marketplace also requested that the IMF impose 
standards and codes, namely the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs) that are included within FSAPs, by publishing ‘simplified, quantitative 
measures of compliance’ (Best, 2010). Within this narrative, quantitative measures 
and targets provide a means for standardization and domination. Best’s excellent 
work on transparency and ambiguity is particularly important in thinking through 
these issues, since she demonstrates how ambiguity provides political space to actors 
to manoeuvre and interpret commonly agreed standards (see also Seabrooke, 2007). 
Best (2005) suggests that international systems of monetary and financial governance 
that are based on ambiguous politics are more likely to be sustained, such as during 
the heyday of the Bretton Woods system. In particular, Best has highlighted how the 
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IMF’s Articles of Agreement lacked a precise definition of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium’ that provided intersubjective flexibility among states in how this 
principle was interpreted (Best, 2005: 56, 84). Conversely, international governance 
regimes based on transparency and universal standards are more likely to restrict 
choice and suffer from inflexibility during periods of crisis (Best, 2010). Ambiguity 
can be positively embraced yet key international institutions, such as the IMF, insist 
on transparency and concepts such as ‘ownership’ that are a wolf of domination 
cloaked in cosmopolitan sheep’s clothing (Best, 2006b). We agree with Best’s broader 
argument when it is tied to the IMF’s policy proclamations. But we do not think that 
the stress on transparency reflects how IMF staff actually behave when constructing 
benchmarks and ‘numbers’ to enhance policy dialogue. We suggest that ambiguity is 
a key feature of how the IMF staff use numbers within FSAPs. 
 
Our argument builds upon some emerging scholarship on how staff within 
international organizations behaves in ways that deviate from their explicit 
governance structures. For example, Kate Weaver’s (2008) work on ‘hypocrisy traps’ 
in the World Bank has detailed the development of ‘Bankese’  within the institution 
and traced in fine detail how staff deviate from their supposed masters in 
developing policy practices (see also Park, 2005; Park and Vetterlein, 2010). 
Differently, André Broome and Len Seabrooke (2007, 2008) have suggested that 
while institutions such as the IMF are commonly criticised for ‘one size fits all’ 
policies, archival research demonstrates that they actively work towards 
‘associational templates’ according to the type of economy or by region. 
Furthermore, they suggest that these templates provide a means for the IMF to 
provide comparative policy information that is desired by states. Broome (2008, 
2010a) has also demonstrated how the IMF’s capacity to generate policy knowledge 
makes it a ‘reputational intermediary’, especially in cases where the market has 
weak information about an economy (on reputation see also Sharman, 2008). We 
suggest that benchmarks and targets, including loan conditions, are often requested 
by recipient states (Vreeland, 2003). While the stress within the literature is on the 
external scrutiny of international markets upon governments, policymakers in 
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national settings have clear incentives to acquire comparative policy knowledge 
from the IMF while also protecting their financial sector to curry favour with local 
lobby groups (Mosely, 2008). Governments have an interest in talking to the IMF to 
acquire policy knowledge, even if it permits them to use this knowledge to protect 
their own regime rather than simply reform their institutions to the IMF’s wishes. 
 
We suggest that there is an alternative way to viewing the use of quantitative targets 
and benchmarks within IMF loan programs and surveillance as tools of domination 
in the quest for transparency. We put forward the notion that the IMF’s use of the 
FSAP programme may also be seen as a form of pragmatist learning. Drawing from 
organizational sociology, especially the work of Charles Sabel (2004 2006), we 
suggest that the IMF uses quantitative benchmarks and targets in a deliberately 
ambiguous way in a manner that can be associated with the an early form of 
pragmatic learning.  
 
Work on pragmatism in organizational sociology is concerned with understanding 
how actors and organizations can learn in the absence of clear command structures 
that are followed or goal coherence (Sabel, 2006: 132). Pragmatists stress that rather 
than working while principal-agent dynamics may be at play, the coherence of 
instructions from principals may be weak, that principals may not know what they 
are doing, and as such agents are left to their own devices (Widmaier, 2004; cf. 
Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). Agents may also seek to carve out their own 
autonomy from principals, in part through the development of an internal culture, 
such as within bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). As such, 
these actors need to find ways of establishing practices for governing, but it in public 
or private life that can enable target setting and, most importantly, learning. Such 
behaviour can operate between firms within regional and national settings 
(Whitford, 2005), or within national and transnational settings (Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2004). It can also be applied to international organizations and the creation of 
governing practices that are not only more effective and legitimate but also more 
potentially democratic (Cohen and Sabel, 2005). 
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There is a parallel between Charles Sabel’s (2004) critique of New Public 
Management (NPM) governance processes that applies to how the IMF runs FSAPs. 
Within NPM, stress is placed on top-down governing processes which dictate 
narrow performance goals which are then used to evaluate programme success. The 
establishment of performance targets leads to less bureaucracy in principle and more 
focus on generating the right services and information for clients. NPM is also 
legitimated on the grounds that those receiving the services are empowered through 
representation to influence the quality of services and information, even if the 
responsibility for providing a service has been delegated to specialised ministries 
which operate within their own policy vacuum. NPM ultimately creates results-
oriented governance where the conception of goals is effectively removed from their 
execution, since the practical experience of NPM programs has been that those 
creating the performance indicators do not incorporate feedback from 
citizens/customers because it interferes with their specialism (Barzelay, 2001).  
 
Charles Sabel suggests that given the propensity for NPM schemes to fail, new forms 
of governing should be embraced. This is particularly the case when then goals have 
not been clearly defined. Sabel suggests that:  
 
if there are no actors capable of setting goals with the precision needed to guide effective 
public action, governance reform must attend simultaneously to institutionalizing public 
or social learning and allocating decision-making rights—rather than assuming, as often 
is the case now, that learning is automatic when the ‘right’ constellation of principals is in 
control (Sabel, 2004, 3-4) 
 
The aim here, then, is to spot how institutions and organizations can learn in ‘real 
time’ rather than assuming that either the command structure is both strong and 
followed, and that presence of the ‘right’ institutions will lead to optimal results. 
Sabel (2004) suggests that such forms of ‘experimental governance’ can potentially 
be democratic because they encourage processes of deliberation, reasoning, and 
sense-making, and they actively incorporate very localised information into broader 
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governance processes. The use of peer-review and benchmarking may also 
potentially encourage democratic deliberation, but experimental governance need 
not require democratic changes. 
 
Benchmarking within pragmatist scholarship operates as a learning device rather 
than a tool of enforcement. While benchmarks provide common goals, they are 
assembled from existing information and then disassembled and rebuilt when new 
information is found. This search for information is underpinned by the formation of 
routines in which efforts are made to identify root causes of errors and also to form 
environments in which actors use reason to solve problems (Sabel, 2006). While 
benchmarks are commonly assumed to be imposed from above, they can be formed 
through dialogue. It is worth quoting Charles Sabel at length on this point: 
 
The process of re-evaluating goals parallels the process of searching out and assessing 
narrower design choices. Thus the ‘center’ of the encompassing pragmatist institution—
acting on behalf and with the help of representatives of the individual subunits—
metaphorically or openly benchmarks its overall objectives, looking for goals ‘like’ the 
current ones, but arguably better on some dimension.... Accountable behavior in this 
setting no longer entails compliance in the sense of rule following, but rather provision of 
a compelling explanation for choosing, in the light of fresh knowledge, one way of 
achieving the common (sub) goal over others. At the limit principal–agent accountability 
gives way to peer review, in which decision makers learn from and correct each other 
even as they set goals and performance standards for the organization (Sabel, 2006, 135). 
 
Within such a setting, ambiguity plays a positive role in permitting an environment 
for sense-making of which benchmarks are appropriate, and to improve overall 
policy knowledge.  
 
How does pragmatist learning apply to the IMF’s FSAPs? We suggest that seen 
through a pragmatist lens, the IMF staff engaged in FSAP spend a great deal of time 
in trying to create the conditions under which information on a nation’s financial 
sector can be most appropriately discovered. This includes the pragmatic use of 
quantitative targets, as well as permitting ambiguities about how compliance with 
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seemingly hard benchmarks should be assessed.  We do not suggest that FSAP 
provides a democratic form of governance. But we do suggest that ‘pragmatic 
numbers’ are used in FSAPs as tools for a mild form of experimental governance that 
enhances the IMF’s comparative policy knowledge. In this sense, quantitative targets 
are less a means of enforcement and more a tool for learning, reasoning, and sense-
making. We do not suggest that FSAP as a scheme to improve financial stability has 
been successful according to the mandate it was provided. Indeed on many fronts it 
has not done well compared to how other networks and international organizations 
have been able to capture how financial stability problems should be addressed (see 
Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). This is, in large part, because the overall goals and 
aims set by the principals are removed from the policy practice of FSAPs. While the 
IMF executive stresses transparency, the staff uses ambiguity and pragmatic 
numbers to improve their policy knowledge. We suggest that there are also links 
here to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) used in European governance.  We 
are not the first to joint these dots (see Schafer, 2006), but stress that the form of 
policy transfer and learning that FSAP teams engage in is best understood through 
pragmatic forms of governance.  Before outlining these arguments we must situate 
the origins and purpose of FSAPs. 
 
2. The Financial Sector Assessment Program 
 
The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was launched in May 1999 as a 
joint initiative of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
response to the financial crisis of the 1997-8. Specifically, the program was built 
around the twin aims of prevention and cure; greater international cooperation to 
combat potential crisis situations (or at least reduce their severity) and cross-border 
contagion which had emerged from the crisis as a particular threat. The program 
also hoped to promote economic growth by encouraging ‘financial system 
soundness and financial sector diversity’ (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
2005). These aims were to be achieved by conducting thorough analysis of financial 
sectors in individual countries and then presenting the findings to local authorities. 
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A 2006 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Report identifies the FSAP as the 
‘principal platform for financial sector diagnosis at the IMF’ (IEO, 2006). The 
program also sought to provide information to the market, where countries 
permitted, on financial stability with the aim of providing greater market 
transparency and enhancing the prospects for investment. 
 
The program aimed to be comprehensive by focusing not only on financial sector 
soundness and performance but also linking findings on the former to broader 
macroeconomic issues. By concentrating on both development and stability, the 
program hoped to provide ‘consistent’ financial advice to countries through a more 
holistic perspective. Furthermore, along with IMF and WB staff, the FSAP was to 
employ experts from national authorities and standard setting bodies as well, to 
ensure a coordinated exercise that would maximise ‘scarce expert resources’ and 
prevent a ‘duplication of efforts’ (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 2005). 
For example, as FSAPs include an assessment of external standards not generated by 
the IMF, such as on banking supervision set by the Basle Committee for Banking 
Supervision (Tsingou, 2008; Seabrooke, 2006), it is common for FSAP teams to 
include staff from, for example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  
Resources are a particular concern for the FSAP with a post-2003 FSAP costing 
approximately $668,000 on average (IEO, 2006). The management at the program’s 
onset had hoped to conduct 24 FSAPs annually. In 2003 review, this number was 
revised to 17-19 annual exercises due to constrained resources, which in turn meant 
that it would take about a decade to conduct FSAPs for the current list of member 
countries (IEO, 2006). The constraint on resources within FSAPs has placed greater 
stress on goal-setting and benchmarking in a manner consistent with the discussion 
of NPM above and also consistent with the notion that the IMF imposes a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ model. However, commands from above do not always translate into how 
work is actually practiced (Lipsky, 1980, for an ethnography of the IMF see Harper, 
1998). 
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In a formal sense, work between the IMF and WB on FSAPs is coordinated by the 
Bank-Fund Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC), which has developed the 
operational procedures for carrying out the exercise and the updates. The 
operational procedures were outlined as such with certain considerations in mind, 
amongst which were the following two-- that the FSAP should ‘feed into’ the annual 
Article IV consultations by, ideally, ensuring ‘close linkages’ with IMF surveillance 
activities and that the WB should also be able to use information generated in the 
exercise for its programs such as country assessment strategies and social and 
structural reviews (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 2005). Indeed, 
surveillance activity constitutes a large part of what the IMF does as an institution 
(Pauly, 1997), although discussions over financial stability issues at the Board level 
have been ‘perfunctory’ and have at times even missed the ‘key issues’ of particular 
FSSAs (IEO, 2006, 45). The committee also decides on the mission chiefs for the 
exercises and consequently whether the FSAP will be led by a staff member of the 
WB or the IMF. The IMF however, is responsible for leadership and all FSAP related 
output in any country which lacks WB presence.  
 
The FSAP procedures guide outlines issues integral to the exercise such as country 
selection, contact with authorities, preparatory work at headquarters and also FSAP 
documentation. The process of country selection was refined in 2001 to include 
certain criteria like a country's systemic importance, its external sector weakness or 
financial vulnerability, the nature of its exchange rate and monetary regime and its 
geographic balance among countries (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
2005). An important aspect of the FSAP however, is that it is voluntary in nature and 
countries have to initiate the process by first indicating an interest.  
 
Therefore, even though analysis by the Fund and Bank might indicate the strategic 
importance of conducting an FSAP in a country, nothing can be done unless the 
country acknowledges such a need. Both a 2003 review and the IEO 2006 evaluation 
highlight the importance of creating the right ‘incentive structure’ to ensure that 
systemically important countries can be convinced to join the exercise and yet both 
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also advocated a continuance of the program’s voluntary nature (IEO, 2006, 60). 
This, of course, could just be an acknowledgement of practical realities because as an 
official noted, it is not possible even to make the exercise a standard 
recommendation—the G7, for example, would be held back by the fact that the 
United States is yet to agree to an FSAP. 
 
The first phase in the FSAP exercise, called ‘scoping’, is the preparation of a 
document identifying key issues to be considered under the FSAP and the particular 
Terms of Reference (TOR), by the mission chief and other team members in 
conjunction with the relevant (geographic) area departments. The involvement of 
national authorities at this stage was unclear based on staff interviews—while an 
interviewee mentioned active involvement to discuss the ‘scope’ of the FSAP, 
another stated that it was important to keep this step independent of authorities to 
have an unbiased assessment. The IEO report discovered that country authorities 
were somewhat dissatisfied with their level of involvement in the establishment of 
the TOR and in relation also felt that IMF and WB staff did not spend enough time 
familiarizing themselves with the particular ‘country circumstances’ (IEO, 2006). 
Reflecting this dissatisfaction, one senior official commented that countries often 
requested that IMF staff on FSAPs should ideally have spent only a short period of 
time at the institution and were therefore more likely to have skills and ideas that 
were more likely to relate to private financial markets, and that they were more 
likely to not be indoctrinated into IMF groupthink.2  The scoping process is followed 
by a 2-3 week field mission during which, the team analyses the data made available 
by local authorities.  
 
At the conclusion of the FSAP, assessments of the observance of financial standards 
and codes are put together in the ROSC. Yet another document called the Financial 
Structure Stability Assessment (FSSA) includes issues relevant for IMF surveillance, 
such as the risk to macroeconomic stability from financial sector and the resilience of 
the sector in the face of macroeconomic shocks (International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
The publication of both these documents is also voluntary.  
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The two main analytical tools of the FSAP are stress tests and ‘Financial Soundness 
Indicators’ (FSIs). The FSIs represent the hard quantitative edge within FSAPs and 
provide a pivot for policy discussions. The development of FSIs, according to the 
IMF, ‘responds to the need for better tools to assess the strengths and vulnerabilities 
of the financial system’ (International Monetary Fund, 2008) and the process began 
with the development of the FSAP as previous monetary statistics collected by the 
IMF had not focused on information pertaining to financial soundness and the 
probable risks (IMF, 2001). Following a meeting with relevant experts in 1999, who 
recognised that no standard model was in existence which could dictate the 
indicators needed for this particular sort of analysis, in mid-2000, the IMF conducted 
the Survey on the Use, Compilation, and Dissemination of Macroprudential Indicators 
(IMF, 2000). The survey asked member countries and regional and international 
agencies, the types of indicators they needed, the availability of the data, and the 
standards they used for compiling the data. Based on this, the IMF identified a core 
set of indicators that countries should compile and an additional list of ‘encouraged’ 
FSIs (Jose, Krueger, and Khay, 2008).   
 
In 2004, the IMF published the Compilation Guide: Financial Soundness Indicators, 
which provides countries with major definitions and offers guidance on main 
concepts and sources and techniques to assist in the compilation and dissemination 
of ‘internally consistent, cross-country comparable sets of indicators’ which could be 
informative about the ‘current soundness of the aggregate financial system’. For 
defining standards on particular issues, the IMF adopted those already in existence 
and issued by other international bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (IMF, 2006), which raises a number of legitimacy problems. The 
generation of FSIs easily fits with the perception of the IMF imposing constraints 
upon states through the insistence on quantitative ‘numbers’. We suggest that the 
actual practice of generating FSIs and FSAPs suggests that the IMF uses these 
numbers pragmatically within ambiguous frameworks. Rather than transparency 
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and external enforcement by voluntary reporting to the international marketplace, 
these ‘numbers’ provide a means for policy discussion and mutual learning. 
 
 
3. The FSAP and Pragmatic Numbers in Practice: Evidence from Interviews 
 
If FSAP indicators, such as FSIs are soft targets created for dialogue and mutual 
learning rather than as hard quantitative targets for policy enforcement, then the 
views that IMF operates according to a rational Principal-Agent dynamics, and that 
the IMF seeks to impose transparency and a global standard, require some 
adjustment. Following personal and phone interviews with IMF staff engaged with 
FSAP, we suggest that the IMF uses ‘pragmatic numbers’.  
 
We suggest, like see Armin Schafer (2006), that some IMF practices have more in 
common with ‘soft’ horizontal forms of network governance than they do with 
‘hard’ vertical command structures. One form of experimental governance 
commonly associated with pragmatist learning is the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) within European governance (see, in particular, Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). The 
OMC emerged in the 1990s in opposition to concrete legislation or hard law, as 
‘another strategy of policy intervention started to be considered and experimented 
with, resting on a complex mix of soft institutional ingredients, endowed with a 
strong potential of conditioning the direction of change at the national level’ (Ferrera, 
Matsaganis, & Sacchi, 2002, 227). The key means of permitting the OMC to do this is 
through the peer review, joint evaluation, and to establish common flexible 
guidelines. 
 
We do not suggest that FSAPs mirror the OMC, but that the program practice differs 
from the policy proclamations in ways that suggest strong elements of pragmatic 
learning. This can be seen not only in staff documents but also in interviews with 
IMF staff who have been involved in the exercise at one point or other, since the 
program’s conception in 1999. According to an IEO draft, the ‘FSAP was initially 
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conceived as a diagnostic and policy advice tool’ and was ‘designed to work at two 
levels: (i) confidential advice to country authorities and (ii) peer review’ stating 
further that ‘the FSAP’s role in linking policy recommendations to effecting policy 
and institutional changes ... was limited to follow-up work intended to assess and 
inform on progress’ (IEO, 2004). 
 
In its very construction, the FSAP is in effect equivalent to the ‘first step’ in the OMC 
during which broader policy goals are established. Although focusing on a 
particular policy sphere, i.e. finance and economic policy, the FSAP had the specific 
aim of ensuring a ‘systematic assessment and monitoring of financial systems to 
identify strengths, vulnerabilities and risks’ (IEO, 2004). This was to prevent the 
perpetuation of another crisis, given the reputational damage the IMF faced post-
Asian financial crisis, especially because it misdiagnosed the impact of financial 
liberalisation upon East Asian states (Moschella, 2010).  
 
Two main policy tools were to be employed to achieve this end: stress testing for 
micro-financial linkages rooted in macroeconomic shocks and FSIs for ‘evaluation 
and monitoring’ (Independent Evaluation Office, 2004). The latter could be 
comprised of indicators which were already in existence and were used by other 
international organisations like the BIS. However, questions concerning the 
comparability of FSIs were raised, given that they had been part of the initial design 
for ‘achieving consistent assessments of financial systems across countries’ 
(Independent Evaluation Office, 2004). Our interviewees expressed reservations 
about such a comparison, citing differences in calculation procedures between 
countries as the main reason and even going as far as to say cross country 
comparisons had never been the goal for FSAPs.3  From our interviews, most staff 
agreed that the best use of FSIs was in the discussions that they generated with local 
authorities on the manner in which they had been put together and the general trend 
that they might depict, when considered in light of figures over a certain number of 
years. According to an official who has partaken in previous FSAPs, the most 
important contribution of the figures are ‘the questions they raise’ about 
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methodology and the processes undertaken by local authorities, adding that local 
authorities often ’do not know what they [FSIs] are’.4  IMF FSAP staff highlighted 
the fact that numbers are in fact a medium for dialogue rather than an end in 
themselves,  he added that ‘good mission chiefs do not rely on FSIs’ in assessing 
financial health.5 FSAP staff use FSIs as a means of gaining information about a 
country’s financial system rather than as a tool for policy enforcement. The 
ambiguity in the process of generating FSIs permits dialogue between the FSAP 
team and the country in question. This view was affirmed in our discussions country 
representations, who stressed that FSAPs are used to acquire comparative policy 
knowledge.6 
 
From our interviews, the reasons cited for countries choosing to undergo the FSAP 
also shed light on its centrality as a forum for policy dialogue. All interviewees 
stated that country authorities felt that it was a beneficial process talking to the IMF 
staff given the ‘expertise and knowledge’ that they offered.7 Commenting on the 
initiative of developing countries, a senior IMF official stated, ‘many have a reform 
process undergoing and an agenda in place and want ratification of their review’ by 
the IMF.8 This implicitly acknowledges the view of the IMF as a leader in knowledge 
in the field of economic policy and showcases the similarity of the FSAP to forms of 
governance that stress pragmatic learning. In this situation the IMF engages in 
benchmark setting through FSAPs to generate dialogue rather than policy 
enforcement. 
 
Through the interviews, it became clear that the voluntary nature of the FSAP also 
contributed to the policy dialogue that follows- IMF staff made out the FSAP to be 
akin to Technical Assistance, whereby their interactions are primarily with ‘technical 
people... who speak the same language’, i.e.—that of quantitative target setting.8 
This, in their view, keeps explicit politics out of the dialogue. Given the potential for 
public information that can hurt countries’ international reputation, interviewees 
stressed that tensions exist around the wording of the FSAP reports which, based on 
the wishes of the particular country, may or may not be made public. One official 
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stated the ‘tug of war’ that ensues between IMF staff and country officials to 
‘nuance’ the wording in the report in view of the impact the publication of the report 
might have.9 For the same reason, FSAPs have been criticised for deemphasising the 
role of international capital markets on a country’s financial sector despite the 
obvious link between financial stability and international financial integration. This 
is also one key reason on why the market’s view of FSAPs has been weak (Seabrooke 
and Tsingou, 2009). This latter point however, is well understood amongst IMF staff 
and according to interviewees there has been greater emphasis on exploring these 
linkages in recent years. However, as stated by a Senior Official, the possibility of 
this is somewhat limited as sometimes understanding the situation of a country 
within a regional setting would require not one FSAP but four or five, depending on 
the deepness of linkages with other countries.  
 
The depoliticisation of policy dialogue through the ambiguity of numbers reflects both 
the IMF’s attempts at learning and also relates to broader principal-agent problems 
that are prominent in the literature on the IMF. For example, one senior IMF official 
stated the ‘Board has asked [us]not to be explicit about rating countries’  and that the 
tone of the reports ‘depends on the urgency’ of the case.10  
 
In the FSAP, while the exercise is to assess the adherence to international standards 
and codes, IMF officials asserted that the benchmarks are mere guidelines, stressing the 
importance of ‘a country specific approach’, with one official stating that often ’the 
more you dig the more differences you find’ and that therefore, it is important to 
take this into consideration when using numbers.11 According to officials, the IMF 
does not in itself set any benchmarks prior to the FSAP although in the words of an 
official, clear benchmarks ‘would be an ideal situation’.12 The IMF does face an 
additional constraint in how it assesses ROSCs within FSAPs given that most of the 
standards are created externally within bodies in which most developing countries 
have no representation. This creates obvious legitimacy problems for the IMF while 
also providing FSAP staff with greater incentive to develop learning tools through 
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FSAPs rather than using benchmarks as enforcement tools to partially address this 
legitimacy deficit. 
 
While differences can be endemic to the financial structures within the country, they 
can also be a result of the previously mentioned issue of methodology which raises 
the issue of how the country and the FSAP team communicate over the quality of 
data provided by countries. Other than just creating a lack of cross-country 
compatibility FSAP staff stressed the ‘burden of interpretation’ in data gathering.13 
Such a burden is negative for staff when considering their mandate and resource 
constraints, which would logically lead to a stronger imposition of external 
standards. But this has not been the case. Rather, the burden of interpretation reflects 
the role ambiguity over numbers plays in fostering learning between the FSAP staff 
and the country officials. Such ambiguity does not come without commitment. As 
commented to us by one senior IMF staff member, ‘it is the country who expressed 
interest’, where the terms of assessment and frame for evaluation are established and 
that the ‘exercise starts with them [countries] taking ownership and that helps with 
having an open dialogue’.14 The key question here is the extent to which the 
generation of FSIs and other quantitative targets reflect rigid external standards, or 
whether they actually represent ‘pragmatic numbers’ where the stress is on learning. 
We suggest that our pragmatic learning argument is a closer fit to the program 
practice of FSAPs even though the IMF’s own policy proclamations stress 
transparency and universality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The late-1990s were an important period for the IMF—with the backdrop of the 
financial crisis and widespread criticism in its dealings with crisis economies, the 
need for a program that addressed financial soundness issues and the possibility of 
future crisis was critical. The FSAP, which emerged in the wake of these 
circumstances, was engineered as a monitoring tool which inevitably harked back to 
either established or newly constructed ‘global’ standards. IMF staff identified the 
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uniform approach that was central to the program at its conception but the evolution 
of the program saw some marked deviations from its original construct. As it 
became clear through the early years that the numbers that were to be used for 
evaluation were almost certainly not uniform between states, this rising ambiguity 
was used  to generate policy dialogues that otherwise might have been too overtly 
political. The voluntary nature of the program, in part by design and in part due to 
political constraints, further re-enforced the notion of ‘soft-targets’ that are part of 
the program. As such, within FSAPs countries are ‘advised’ to adopt a certain core 
set of soundness indicators and a few additional indicators are ‘recommended’.15 
The fact that countries must initiate the process further legitimises the implicit 
demands of the program and thereby sets the framework for the dialogue that is to 
ensue. The deemphasise placed on international capital markets leads to greater 
stress on understanding domestic systems and providing a platform for mutual 
learning and discussion via ‘pragmatic numbers’, such as the determination of 
Financial Soundness Indicators.  
 
In this paper we have argued that IMF engages in forms of pragmatic learning that 
are obscured if our focus on the IMF is how staff obey executive commands, or how 
the IMF’s policy proclamations have increasingly stressed transparency. This 
literature, reviewed above, makes excellent points about the IMF’s governance 
structure. However, we suggest that program practice can differ from policy 
proclamations. Our interviews with FSAP staff and country representatives stressed 
how benchmarks and quantitative targets are used as ‘soft’ tools for policy dialogue 
rather than ‘hard’ tools for policy enforcement. Not only is the stress on learning 
consistent with our interviewees but also from survey responses from countries who 
have been through FSAPs (IEO, 2006, 45). Almost all authorities acknowledge the 
benefits of interacting with experts and the knowledge sharing that occurs as a 
consequence. The impact that the exercise has on policy spheres, be it validation of 
already existent local priorities as one IMF personnel suggested, or the construction 
of entirely new debates and norms, is indubitable. In this light ‘pragmatic numbers’ 
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are used as the basis for a dialogue between similar professionals who are versed in 
the same language but might come from different settings.  
 
The international financial crisis of 2007-9 has raised many questions about what 
purpose the IMF serves in the contemporary international political economy and 
whether or not it should be actively involved in shaping financial sectors (Broome, 
2010b). While the IMF is often considered to be an institution which is strongly 
undermined by the veto power given to the US in its governance structure, a view 
we strongly agree with, we suggest that its training and surveillance capacities can 
be enhanced along more decentralised experimentalist governance lines. There is no 
doubt that the IMF’s governance structure does dampen the potential to combine 
pragmatic learning with more openly democratic forms of governance. However, 
recognising the potential for policy learning provides an insight into how the IMF 
can be reformed to help countries improve their institutions and technical capacities 
in a manner that favours reason and conversation over dogma and compliance. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The Authors conducted interviews at the IMF in September-October 2008 with senior and 
junior staff at the IMF working on the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Additional 
phone interviews with IMF senior staff were also conducted from April-June 2009. We have 
noted the rank of the official and month of the discussion when quoting interviewees, but 
otherwise protect their anonymity as requested. 
2  Personal interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, October 2008. 
3  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, May 2009. 
4  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
5  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
6  Phone interview with IMF Country Representative, May 2009. 
7  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, May 2009. 
8  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
9  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
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10  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, May 2009. 
11 Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, May 2009. 
12  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
13  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
14  Phone interview with IMF Senior FSAP Official, June 2009. 
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